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Abstract
In Dempster-Shafer belief theory, general beliefs are expressed as belief mass distribution func-
tions over frames of discernment. In Subjective Logic beliefs are expressed as belief mass
distribution functions over binary frames of discernment. Belief representations in Subjective
Logic, which are called opinions, also contain a base rate parameter which express the a priori
belief in the absence of evidence. Philosophically, beliefs are quantitative representations of ev-
idence as perceived by humans or by other intelligent agents. The basic operators of classical
probability calculus, such as addition and multiplication, can be applied to opinions, thereby
making belief calculus practical. Through the equivalence between opinions and Beta proba-
bility density functions, this also provides a calculus for Beta probability density functions. This
article explains the basic elements of belief calculus.
1 Introduction
Belief theory has its origin in a model for upper and lower probabilities proposed by Dempster
in 1960. Shafer later proposed a model for expressing beliefs [7]. The main idea behind belief
theory is to abandon the additivity principle of probability theory, i.e. that the sum of proba-
bilities on all pairwise exclusive possibilities must add up to one. Instead belief theory gives
observers the ability to assign so-called belief mass to any subset of the frame of discernment,
i.e. non-exclusive possibilities including the whole frame itself. The main advantage of this
approach is that ignorance, i.e. the lack of information, can be explicitly expressed e.g. by
assigning belief mass to the whole frame. Shafer’s book [7] describes many aspects of belief
theory, but the two main elements are 1) a flexible way of expressing beliefs, and 2) a method
for combining beliefs, commonly known as Dempster’s Rule.
2 Representing Opinions
Belief representation in classic belief theory[7] is based on an exhaustive set of mutually exclu-
sive atomic states which is called the frame of discernment Θ. The power set 2Θ is the set of all
sub-states of Θ. A bba (basic belief assignment1) is a belief distribution function mΘ mapping
1Called basic probability assignment in [7].
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2Θ to [0, 1] such that∑
x⊆Θ
mΘ(x) = 1 , where mΘ(∅) = 0 . (1)
The bba distributes a total belief mass of 1 amongst the subsets of Θ such that the belief mass
for each subset is positive or zero. Each subset x ⊆ Θ such that mΘ(x) > 0 is called a focal
element of mΘ. In the case of total ignorance, mΘ(Θ) = 1, and mΘ is called a vacuous bba. In
case all focal elements are atoms (i.e. one-element subsets of Θ) then we speak about Bayesian
bba. A dogmatic bba is when mΘ(Θ) = 0 [8]. Let us note that, trivially, every Bayesian bba is
dogmatic.
In addition, we also define the Dirichlet bba, and its cluster variant, as follows.
Definition 1 (Dirichlet bba) A bba where the possible focal elements are Θ and/or singletons
of Θ, is called a Dirichlet belief distribution function.
Definition 2 (Cluster Dirichlet bba) A bba where the only focal elements are Θ and/or mu-
tually exclusive subsets of Θ (singletons or clusters of singletons), is called a cluster Dirichlet
belief distribution function.
It can be noted that Bayesian bbas are a special case of Dirichlet bbas.
The Dempster-Shafer theory [7] defines a belief function b(x). The probability transfor-
mation [1]2 projects a bba onto a probability expectation value denoted by E(x). In addition,
subjective logic [2] defines a disbelief function d(x), an uncertainty function u(x), and a base
rate function3 a(x), defined as follows:
b(x) =
∑
∅6=y⊆x
m(y) ∀ x ⊆ Θ , (2)
d(x) =
∑
y∩x=∅
m(y) ∀ x ⊆ Θ , (3)
u(x) =
∑
y ∩ x 6= ∅
y 6⊆ x
m(y) ∀ x ⊆ Θ , (4)
a(x) = |x|/|Θ| ∀ x ⊆ Θ , (5)
E(x) =
∑
y⊆Θ
mΘ(y)
|x ∩ y|
|y|
∀ x ⊆ Θ . (6)
In case |Θ| > 2, coarsening is necessary in order to apply subjective logic operators. Choose
x ⊆ Θ, and let x be the complement of x in Θ, then X = {x, x} is a binary frame, and x is
called that target of the coarsening. The coarsened bba on X can consist of the three belief
masses bx = mX(x), dx = mX(x) and ux = mX(X), called belief, disbelief and uncertainty
respectively. Coarsened belief masses can be computed e.g. with simple or normal coarsening
as defined in [2, 4], or with smooth coarsening defined next.
2Also known as the pignistic transformation [9, 10]
3Called relative atomicity in [2].
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Definition 3 (Smooth Coarsening) Let Θ be a frame of discernment and let b(x), d(x), u(x)
and a(x) be the belief, disbelief, uncertainty and base rate functions of the target state x ⊆ Θ,
with probability expectation value E(x). Let X = {x, x} be the binary frame of discernment,
where x is the complement of x in Θ. Smooth coarsening of Θ into X produces the correspond-
ing belief, disbelief, uncertainty and base rate functions bx, dx, ux and ax defined by:
For E(x) ≤ b(x) + a(x)u(x) :


bx =
E(x)b(x)
b(x)+a(x)u(x)
dx = 1−
E(x)(b(x)+u(x))
b(x)+a(x)u(x)
ux =
E(x)u(x)
b(x)+a(x)u(x)
ax = a(x) ,
for E(x) > b(x) + a(x)u(x) :


bx = 1−
(1−E(x))(d(x)+u(x))
1−b(x)−a(x)u(x)
dx =
(1−E(x))d(x)
1−b(x)−a(x)u(x)
ux =
(1−E(x))u(x)
1−b(x)−a(x)u(x)
ax = a(x) .
In case the target element for the coarsening is a focal element of a (cluster) Dirichlet belief
distribution function, E(x) = b(x) + a(x)u(x) holds, and the coarsening can be described as
stable.
Definition 4 (Stable Coarsening) Let Θ be a frame of discernment, and let x ∈ Θ be the target
element for the coarsening. Let the belief distribution function be a Dirichlet (cluster or not)
bba such that the target element is also a focal element. Then the stable coarsening of Θ into
X produces the belief, disbelief and uncertainty functions bx, dx and ux defined by:
bx = b(x) , dx = d(x) , ux = u(x) .
It can be shown that bx, dx, ux, ax ∈ [0, 1], and that Eq.(7) and Eq.(8) hold.
bx + dx + ux = 1 . (Additivity) (7)
E(x) = bx + axux . (Expectation) (8)
It can be noticed that non-stable coarsening requires an adjustment of the belief, disbelief
and uncertainty functions in general, and this can result in inconsistency when applying the
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consensus operator. The purpose of this paper is to present a method to rectify this problem.
This will be explained in further detail in the sections below.
The ordered quadruple ωx = (bx, dx, ux, ax), called the opinion about x, is equivalent to a
bba on a binary frame of discernment X , with an additional base rate parameter ax which can
carry information about the relative size of x in Θ.
The opinion space can be mapped into the interior of an equal-sided triangle, where the
the relative distance towards the bottom right, bottom left and the top corners represent belief,
disbelief and uncertainty functions respectively. For an arbitrary opinion ωx = (bx, dx, ux, ax),
the three parameters bx, dx and ux determine the position of the opinion point in the triangle.
The base line is the probability axis. The base rate value can be indicated as a point on the
probability axis.
Fig.1 illustrates an example opinion about x with the value ωx = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5).
a
ω  = (0.7, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5)x
x
xω
xE(  )
0.5 00
1
0.5 0.5
Disbelief1 Belief10
0 1
Uncertainty
Probability axis
Example opinion:
Projector
Figure 1: Opinion triangle with example opinion
The projector going through the opinion point, parallel to the line that joins the uncertainty
corner and the base rate point, determines the probability expectation value E(x) = bx + axux.
Although an opinion has 4 parameters, it only has 3 degrees of freedom because the three
components bx, dx and ux are dependent through Eq.(7). As such they represent the traditional
Bel(x) (Belief) and Pl(x) (Plausibility) pair of Shaferian belief theory through the correspon-
dence Bel(x) = b(x) and Pl(x) = b(x)+u(x). The disbelief function d(x) is the same as doubt
of x in Shafer’s book. However, ‘disbelief’ seems to be a better term because the case when it
is certain that x is false, is better described by ‘total disbelief’ than by ‘total doubt’.
The reason why a redundant parameter is kept in the opinion representation is that it allows
for more compact expressions of opinion operators, see e.g. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Various visualisations of opinions are possible to facilitate human interpretation. For this,
see http://sky.fit.qut.edu.au/∼josang/sl/demo/BV.html
3 Mapping Opinions to Beta PDFs
The beta-family of distributions is a continuous family of distribution functions indexed by the
two parameters α and β. The beta distribution beta(α, β) can be expressed using the gamma
4
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function Γ as:
beta(α, β) = Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
P α−1(1−P )β−1 ,
where 0 ≤ P ≤ 1, α > 0, β > 0
(9)
with the restriction that the probability P 6= 0 if α < 1, and P 6= 1 if β < 1. The probability
expectation value of the beta distribution is given by:
E(P ) =
α
α + β
(10)
, where P is the random variable corresponding to the probability.
It can be observed that the beta PDF has two degrees of freedom whereas opinions have
three degrees of freedom as explained in Sec.2. In order to define a bijective mapping between
opinions and beta PDFs, we will augment the beta PDF expression with 1 additional parameter
representing the prior, so that it also gets 3 degrees of freedom.
The α parameter represents the amount of evidence in favour a given outcome or statement,
and the β parameter represents the amount of evidence against the same outcome or statement.
With a given state space, it is possible to express the a priori PDF using a base rate parameter
in addition to the evidence parameters.
The beta PDF parameters with the prior base rate a included can be defined as [2]:
{
α = r + 2a,
β = s+ 2(1− a) ,
(11)
where a represents the a priori base rate, r represents the amount of positive evidence, and s
represents the amount of negative evidence.
We define the augmented beta PDF, denoted ϕ(r, s, a), with 3 parameters as:
ϕ(r, s, a) = beta(α, β) , given Eq.(11). (12)
This augmented beta distribution function distinguishes between the a priori base rate a,
and the a posteriori observed evidence (r, s).
The probability expectation value of the augmented Beta distribution is given by:
E(P ) =
r + 2a
r + s+ 2
(13)
, where P is the random variable corresponding to the probability.
For example, when an urn contains unknown proportions of red and black balls, the likeli-
hood of picking a red ball is not expected to be greater or less than that of picking a black ball,
so the a priori probability of picking a red ball is a = 0.5, and the a priori augmented beta
distribution is ϕ(0, 0, 1
2
) = beta(1, 1) as illustrated in Fig.2.
Assume that an observer picks 8 balls, of which 7 turn out to be red and only one turns out
to be black. The updated augmented beta distribution of the outcome of picking red balls is
ϕ(7, 1, 1
2
) = beta(8, 2) which is illustrated in Fig.3.
5
Audun Jøsang
 0
 1
 2
 3
 4
 5
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
pProbability
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 d
en
sit
y 
 B
et
a( 
  | 1
,1 )
p
Figure 2: A priori ϕ(0, 0, 1
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Figure 3: Updated ϕ(7, 1, 1
2
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The expression for augmented beta PDFs has 3 degrees of freedom and allows a bijective
mapping to opinions [2], defined as:


r = 2bx/ux
s = 2dx/ux
1 = bx+dx+ux
a = ax ,
⇔


bx = r/(r+s+2)
dx = s/(r+s+2)
ux = 2/(r+s+2)
ax = a .
(14)
It can be noted that under this correspondence, the example opinion of Fig.1 and the beta
distribution of Fig.3 are equivalent.
4 Mapping Opinions to Basic Probability Vectors
Both the opinion and the augmented Beta representation have the inconvenience that they do
not explicitly express the probability expectation value. Although simple to compute with ei-
ther Eq.8 or Eq.13, it represent a barrier for quick and intuitive interpretation by humans. We
therefore propose a representation in the form of a Basic Probability Vector with three degrees
of freedom that explicitly expresses the probability expectation value.
Definition 5 Basic Probability Vector Let Θ be a frame of discernment where x ⊂ Θ , and let
e be the subjective probability expectation value of x as seen by an observer A. Let u be the
uncertainty of e, equivalent to the uncertainty defined for opinions. Let a be the base rate of x
in Θ, equivalent of the base rate defined for opinions. The Basic Probability Vector, denoted by
piAx , is defined as piAx = (e, u, a)
6
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In this context, the probability p is simple to interpret. In case u = 0, then e is a frequentist
probability. In case u = 1, then e = a, i.e. a is the probability expectation value of an
augmented Beta probability density function where r = s = 0.
The equivalence between opinions and basic probability vectors is defined below. The un-
certainty and base rate parameters are identical in both representations, and their mapping is
therefore not needed.
{
e = b+ au
b+ d+ u = 1
⇔
{
b = e− au
d = 1− e− u(1− a)
(15)
5 Addition and Subtraction of Opinions
Addition of beliefs corresponds to determining the probability of the disjunction of two mutu-
ally exclusive subsets in a frame of discernment, given the probabilities of the original addend
subsets. This is illustrated in Fig.4 below.
Frame of discernment
Addend 
subset
Frame of discernment
Subset Subset
Sum subset
Addend 
subset
Figure 4: Addition principle
Subtraction of beliefs correspond to determining the probability of the difference of two
subsets, given the probabilities of the original minuend and subtrahend subsets, where the subset
of the minuend contains the subset of the subtrahend.
Frame of discernment Frame of discernment
Subset
Subtra-
hend
subset
Minuend subset
Diffe-
rence
subset
Figure 5: Subtraction principle
5.1 Addition of Opinions
The addition of opinions in subjective logic is a binary operator that takes opinions in a single
frame of discernment about two mutually exclusive alternatives (i.e. two disjoint subsets of the
7
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frame of discernment), and outputs an opinion about the union of the subsets. Let the two sets
be denoted by x and y, so x and y are subsets of Θ such that x∩y = ∅, then we are interested in
the opinion about x∪y, given opinions about x and y. Since x and y are mutually exclusive, then
it is to be expected that bx ≤ dy and by ≤ dx as belief in either necessarily requires disbelief in
the other. Since x and y are mutually exclusive, the belief in the union must be able to account
for both the belief in x and the belief in y, so that the first option that can be considered is
bx∪y = bx + by, so that bx∪y has been partitioned exactly into the two possibilities. In order to
calculate the atomicity of x ∪ y, it is merely necessary to point out that
a(x ∪ y) = |x∪y|
|Θ|
= |x|+|y|
|Θ|
= |x|
|Θ|
+ |y|
|Θ|
= a(x) + a(y),
as |x ∪ y| = |x| + |y| since x and y are disjoint. Therefore the atomicity of x ∪ y is given by
ax∪y = ax + ay. Similarly, the expectation value of x ∪ y must be given by
E(x ∪ y) = E(x) + E(y),
since the probabilities of x and y are summed to calculate the probability of x∪ y in probability
calculus, and expectation value is linear on random variables (i.e. if U and V are random
variables and µ and ν are real numbers, then E[µU + νV ] = µE[U ] + νE[V ]). This gives us
sufficient information to be able to calculate the opinion about x ∪ y, with the result that
bx∪y = bx + by, (16)
dx∪y =
ax(dx − by) + ay(dy − bx)
ax + ay
, (17)
ux∪y =
axux + ayuy
ax + ay
, (18)
ax∪y = ax + ay. (19)
By using the symbol “+” to denote the addition operator for opinions, we can write:
ωx + ωy = ωx∪y . (20)
Note that the uncertainty of x ∪ y is the weighted average of the uncertainties of x and y,
and the disbelief in x ∪ y is the weighted average of what is left in each case when the belief in
one is subtracted from the disbelief in the other (when the amount of probability that neither is
true is estimated), i.e. the disbelief in x ∪ y is the weighted average of the two estimates of the
probability that the system is in neither the state x nor the state y.
In the case where ux = uy (i.e. x and y have the same uncertainty), then
bx∪y = bx + by, (21)
dx∪y = dx − by = dy − bx, (22)
ux∪y = ux = uy, (23)
ax∪y = ax + ay, (24)
8
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so that the uncertainty in x ∪ y is equal to the common value of the uncertainty of x and the
uncertainty of y. The disbelief dx∪y in x ∪ y is equal to the result when the belief in either
is subtracted from the disbelief in the other. The fact that dx∪y = dx − by = dy − bx can be
justified by the same sort of arguments that were used to justify bx∪y = bx+ by. Since the states
x and y are mutually exclusive, then belief in x necessitates disbelief in y, so that disbelief in y
can be partitioned into that part which corresponds to belief in x (of magnitude bx) and that part
which corresponds to belief in neither x nor y (of magnitude dy−bx). Since the latter part of the
disbelief in y (of magnitude dy−bx) corresponds to belief in neither x nor y, then it corresponds
to disbelief in x ∪ y, and so it is reasonable that dx∪y = dy − bx.
Various considerations make it natural that disjoint states in the frame of discernment should
have the same uncertainty (and in fact, by the same considerations, all states in the frame of
discernment should have the same uncertainty), especially if the a priori opinions are being
formed, so that the uncertainty is equal to 1 to reflect the complete ignorance about the proba-
bilities, and through updating due to evidence, where the uncertainty is dependent only on the
amount of evidence that has been gathered. But this does not mean that the formulae given
in Equations 16-19 should be disregarded. As noted in the Introduction, there are various op-
erators which can be applied to opinions, and if the results of two such calculations result in
opinions about two disjoint states in the same frame of discernment, the likelihood is that the
opinions about the two states have unequal uncertainties, and the formulae that have to be used
to calculate the sum of the opinions are Equations 16-19, rather than the simpler formulae in
Equations 21-24. This is certainly the case, for example, when x1 and x2 are states in one frame
of discernment, and y1 and y2 are states in another frame of discernment, and either x1 and x2
are disjoint states, or y1 and y2 are disjoint states. If the simple products [4] of opinions (x1∧y1
and x2∧y2) are determined, then they will almost certainly not have the same uncertainty. Sim-
ilarly, if the normal products [4] are determined, then they will almost certainly not have the
same uncertainty.
5.2 Subtraction of Opinions
The inverse operation to addition is subtraction. Since addition of opinions yields the opinion
about x ∪ y from the opinions about disjoint subsets of the frame of discernment, then the
difference between the opinions about x and y (i.e. the opinion about x\y) can only be defined
if y ⊆ x where x and y are being treated as subsets of Θ, the frame of discernment, i.e. the
system must be in the state x whenever it is in the state y. The opinion about x\y is the opinion
about that state which consists exactly of the atomic states of x which are not also atomic states
of y, i.e. the opinion about the state in which the system is in the state x but not in the state y.
Since y ⊆ x, then belief in y requires belief in x, and disbelief in x requires disbelief in y, so
that it is reasonable to require that bx ≥ by and dx ≤ dy. Since y ⊆ x, then |y| ≤ |x|, so that
9
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a(y) ≤ a(x), and so ay ≤ ax. The opinion about x\y is given by
bx\y = bx − by, (25)
dx\y =
ax(dx + by)− ay(1 + by − bx − uy)
ax − ay
, (26)
ux\y =
axux − ayuy
ax − ay
, (27)
ax\y = ax − ay. (28)
Since ux\y should be nonnegative, then this requires that ayuy ≤ axux, and since dx\y should
be nonnegative, then this requires that ax(dx + by) ≥ ay(1 + by − bx − uy).
By using the symbol “-” to denote the subtraction operator for opinions, we can write:
ωx − ωy = ωx\y . (29)
In the case where ux = uy (i.e. x and y have the same uncertainty), then
bx\y = bx − by, (30)
dx\y = dx + by, (31)
ux\y = ux = uy, (32)
ax\y = ax − ay, (33)
so that the uncertainty in x\y is equal to the common value of the uncertainty of x and the
uncertainty of y. The belief bx\y in x\y is all the belief in x (of magnitude bx) except for that
part which is also belief in y (of magnitude by), so that bx\y = bx − by. The disbelief dx\y in
x\y is equal to the sum of the disbelief in x and the belief in y. The fact that dx\y = dx + by
can be justified as follows. Since the state y necessitates the state x (i.e the system must be in
the state x if it is in the state y), then disbelief in x\y falls into two categories: disbelief in x (of
magnitude dx) and belief in y (of magnitude by), with the result that the disbelief in x\y should
be dx + by.
5.3 Negation
The negation of an opinion about proposition x represents the opinion about x being false. This
corresponds to ‘NOT’ in binary logic.
Definition 6 (Negation)
Let ωx = (bx, dx, ux, ax) be an opinion about the propositionx. Then ω¬x = (b¬x, d¬x, u¬x, a¬x)
is the negation of ωx where:
b¬x = dx
d¬x = bx
u¬x = ux
a¬x = 1− ax .
By using the symbol ‘ ¬’ to designate this operator, we define ¬ωx ≡ ω¬x.
Negation can be applied to expressions containing propositional conjunction and disjunc-
tion, and it can be shown that De Morgans’s laws are valid.
10
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6 Products of Binary Frames of Discernment
Multiplication and comultiplication in subjective logic are binary operators that take opinions
about two elements from distinct binary frames of discernment as input parameters. The product
and coproduct opinions relate to subsets of the Cartesian product of the two binary frames of
discernment. The Cartesian product of the two binary frames of discernment X = {x, x} and
Y = {y, y} produces the quaternary set X × Y = {(x, y), (x, y), (x, y), (x, y)} which is
illustrated in Fig.6 below.
x x,y(       )y x,y
y x,y(       ) (       )x,y
(       )
YX x
x
=
YX
x
Figure 6: Cartesian product of two binary frames of discernment
Let ωx and ωy be opinions about x and y respectively held by the same observer. Then the
product opinion ωx∧y is the observer’s opinion about the conjunction x ∧ y = {(x, y)} that
is represented by the area inside the dotted line in Fig.6. The coproduct opinion ωx∨y is the
opinion about the disjunction x ∨ y = {(x, y), (x, y), (x, y)} that is represented by the area
inside the dashed line in Fig.6. Obviously X × Y is not binary, and coarsening is required in
order to determine the product and coproduct opinions. The reduced powerset 2X×Y − {∅}
contains 2|X×Y |− 1 = 15 elements. A short notation for the elements of 2X×Y is used below so
that for example {(x, y), (x, y)} = {x} × Y . The bba on X × Y as a function of the opinions
on x and y is defined by:
m({(x, y)}) = bxby ,
m({(x, y)}) = bxdy ,
m({x} × Y ) = bxuy ,
m({(x, y)}) = dxby ,
m({(x, y)}) = dxdy ,
m({x} × Y ) = dxuy ,
m(X × {y}) = uxby ,
m(X × {y}) = uxdy ,
m(X × Y ) = uxuy .
(34)
It can be shown that the sum of the above belief masses always equals 1. The product does
not produce any belief mass on the following elements:
{(x, y), (x, y)} ,
{(x, y), (x, y)} ,
(X × {y}) ∪ {(x, y)} ,
(X × {y}) ∪ {(x, y)} ,
(X × {y}) ∪ {(x, y)} ,
(X × {y}) ∪ {(x, y)}) .
(35)
The belief functions in for example x ∧ y and x ∨ y can now be determined so that:
b(x ∧ y) = m({(x, y)}),
b(x ∨ y) = m({(x, y)}) +m({(x, y)}) +m({(x, y)}) +
m({x} × Y ) +m(X × {y}) .
(36)
The normal base rate functions for x ∧ y and x ∨ y can be determined by working in the
respective “primitive” frames of discernment, ΘX and ΘY which underlie the definitions of the
11
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sets x and y, respectively. A sample yields a value of (x, y) in the frame of discernment X × Y
exactly when the sample yields an atom θX ∈ x in the frame of discernment ΘX and an atom
θY ∈ y in the frame of discernment ΘY . In other words, a sample yields a value of (x, y) in the
frame of discernment X × Y exactly when the sample yields an atom (θX , θY ) ∈ x × y in the
frame of discernment ΘX ×ΘY , so that (x, y) ∈ X × Y corresponds to x× y ⊆ ΘX ×ΘY in a
natural manner. Similarly, (x, y) corresponds to x × y, (x, y) corresponds to x × y, and (x, y)
corresponds to x× y. The normal base rate function for x ∧ y is equal to:
a(x ∧ y) =
|x× y|
|ΘX ×ΘY |
=
|x| |y|
|ΘX | |ΘY |
=
|x|
|ΘX |
|y|
|ΘY |
= a(x)a(y), (37)
Similarly, the normal base rate of x ∨ y is equal to
a(x ∨ y) =
|(x× y) ∪ (x× y) ∪ (x× y)|
|ΘX ×ΘY |
=
|x× y|+ |x× y|+ |x× y|
|ΘX ×ΘY |
=
|x| |y|+ |x| |y|+ |x| |y|
|ΘX | |ΘY |
= a(x)a(y) + a(x)a(y) + a(x)a(y)
= a(x) + a(y)− a(x)a(y).
By applying simple or normal coarsening to the product frame of discernment and bba, the
normal product and coproduct opinions emerge. A coarsening that focuses on x ∧ y produces
the product, and a coarsening that focuses on x ∨ y produces the coproduct. A Bayesian coars-
ening (i.e. when simple and normal coarsening are equivalent) is only possible in exceptional
cases because some terms of Eq.(34) other than m(X × Y ) will in general contribute to uncer-
tainty about x ∧ y in the case of multiplication, and to uncertainty about x ∨ y in the case of
comultiplication. Specifically, Bayesian coarsening requires m(X × {y}) = m({x} × Y ) = 0
in case of multiplication, and m(X × {y}) = m({x} × Y ) = 0 in case of comultiplication.
Non-Bayesian coarsenings will cause the product and coproduct of opinions to deviate from the
analytically correct product and coproduct. However, the magnitude of this deviation is always
small, as shown in [4].
The symbols “·” and “⊔” will be used to denote multiplication and comultiplication of
opinions respectively so that we can write:
ωx∧y , ωx · ωy (38)
ωx∨y , ωx ⊔ ωy (39)
The product of the opinions about x and y is thus the opinion about the conjunction of x and
y. Similarly, the coproduct of the opinions about x and y is the opinion about the disjunction of
x and y. The exact expressions for product and coproduct are given in Sec.6.1.
Readers might have noticed that Eq.(34) can appear to be a direct application of the non-
normalised version of Dempster’s rule (i.e. the conjunctive rule of combination) [7] which is a
method of belief fusion. However the difference is that Dempster’s rule applies to the beliefs of
two different and independent observers faced with the same frame of discernment, whereas the
Cartesian product of Eq.(34) applies to the beliefs of the same observer faced with two different
and independent frames of discernment. Let ωAx and ωBx represent the opinions of two observers
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A and B about the same proposition x, and let ωA,Bx represent the fusion of A and B’s opinions.
Let further ωAx and ωAy represent observer A’s opinions about the propositions x and y, and let
ωAx∧y represent the product of those opinions. Fig.7 below illustrates the difference between
belief fusion and belief product.
x A,B x
A
B
xω A,B
Aω x
B
xω
[      ]
(a) Belief fusion.
x
A
yω Ay
A
ω Ax    y
x         yAND
Aω x
(b) Belief product.
Figure 7: Conceptual difference between belief fusion and belief product.
The Cartesian product as described here thus has no relationship to Dempster’s rule and
belief fusion other than the apparent similarity between Eq.(34) and Dempster’s rule.
6.1 Normal Multiplication and Comultiplication
Normal multiplication and comultiplication of opinions about independent propositions x and y
are based on normal coarsening defined in [4]. It is also straightforward to define multiplication
and comultiplication based on smooth coarsening, as defined here.
By the arguments within Section 6 for justifying the base rates, we can set ax∧y = axay and
ax∨y = ax + ay − axay. This is in contrast to the case of “simple” conjunction and “simple”
disjunction as discussed above, where atomicities of both the conjunction and the disjunction
are dependent on the beliefs, disbeliefs and uncertainties of x and y. Given opinions about
independent propositions, x and y, then under normal coarsening of the bba for the Cartesian
product of the binary frames of discernment, the normal opinion for the conjunction, x ∧ y, is
given by
bx∧y =
(bx + axux)(by + ayuy)− (1− dx)(1− dy)axay
1− axay
= bxby +
(1− ax)aybxuy + ax(1− ay)uxby
1− axay
,
dx∧y = dx + dy − dxdy,
ux∧y =
(1− dx)(1− dy)− (bx + axux)(by + ayuy)
1− axay
= uxuy +
(1− ay)bxuy + (1− ax)uxby
1− axay
,
ax∧y = axay.
A numerical example of the normal multiplication operator is visualised in Fig.8 below.
Note that in this case, the base rate ax∧y is equal to the real relative cardinality of x ∧ y in
X × Y .
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Figure 8: Visualisation of numerical example of the normal multiplication operator
The formulae for the opinion about x∧y are well formed unless ax = 1 and ay = 1, in which
case the opinions ωx and ωy can be regarded as limiting values, and the product is determined
by the relative rates of approach of ax and ay to 1. Specifically, if η is the limit of 1−ax1−ay , then
bx∧y = bxby +
ηbxuy + uxby
η + 1
,
dx∧y = dx + dy − dxdy,
ux∧y = uxuy +
bxuy + ηuxby
η + 1
,
ax∧y = 1.
Under normal coarsening of the bba for the Cartesian product of the binary frames of discern-
ment, the normal opinion for the disjunction, x ∨ y, is given by
bx∨y = bx + by − bxby,
dx∨y =
(1− (bx + axux))(1− (by + ayuy))− (1− bx)(1− by)(1− ax)(1− ay)
ax + ay − axay
=
(dx + (1− ax)ux)(dy + (1− ay)uy)− (1− bx)(1− by)(1− ax)(1− ay)
ax + ay − axay
= dxdy +
ax(1− ay)dxuy + (1− ax)ayuxdy
ax + ay − axay
,
ux∨y =
(1− bx)(1− by)− (1− (bx + axux))(1− (by + ayuy))
ax + ay − axay
=
(1− bx)(1− by)− (dx + (1− ax)ux)(dy + (1− ay)uy)
ax + ay − axay
= uxuy +
aydxuy + axuxdy
ax + ay − axay
,
ax∨y = ax + ay − axay.
A numerical example of the normal comultiplication operator is visualised in Fig.9 below.
Note that in this case, the base rate ax∨y is equal to the real relative cardinality of x∨y in X×Y .
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Figure 9: Visualisation of numerical example of the normal comultiplication operator
The formulae for the opinion about x ∨ y are well formed unless ax = 0 and ay = 0. In
the case that ax = ay = 0, the opinions ωx and ωy can be regarded as limiting values, and the
product is determined by the relative rates of approach of ax and ay to 0. Specifically, if ζ is the
limit of ax
ay
, then
bx∨y = bx + by − bxby,
dx∨y = dxdy +
ζdxuy + uxdy
ζ + 1
,
ux∨y = uxuy +
dxuy + ζuxdy
ζ + 1
,
ax∨y = 0.
This is a self-dual system under b↔ d, u↔ u, a↔ 1−a, and ∧ ↔ ∨, that is, for example,
the expressions for bx∧y and dx∨y are dual to each other, and one determines the other by the
correspondence, and similarly for the other expressions. This is equivalent to the observation
that the opinions satisfy de Morgan’s Laws, i.e. ωx∧y = ωx∨y and ωx∨y = ωx∧y.
However it should be noted that multiplication and comultiplication are not distributive over
each other, i.e. for example that:
ωx∧(y∨z) 6= ω(x∧y)∨(x∧z) (40)
This is to be expected because if x, y and z are independent, then x ∧ y and x ∧ z are not
generally independent in probability calculus. In fact the corresponding result only holds for
binary logic.
6.2 Normal Division and Codivision
The inverse operation to multiplication is division. The quotient of opinions about propositions
x and y represents the opinion about a proposition z which is independent of y such that ωx =
15
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ωy∧z. This requires that ax ≤ ay, dx ≥ dy, and
bx ≥
ax(1− ay)(1− dx)by
(1− ax)ay(1− dy)
,
ux ≥
(1− ay)(1− dx)uy
(1− ax)(1− dy)
.
The opinion (bx∧y, dx∧y, ux∧y, ax∧y), which is the quotient of the opinion about x and the opin-
ion about y, is given by
bx∧y =
ay(bx + axux)
(ay − ax)(by + ayuy)
−
ax(1− dx)
(ay − ax)(1− dy)
,
dx∧y =
dx − dy
1− dy
,
ux∧y =
ay(1− dx)
(ay − ax)(1− dy)
−
ay(bx + axux)
(ay − ax)(by + ayuy)
,
ax∧y =
ax
ay
,
if ax < ay. If 0 < ax = ay, then the conditions required so that the opinion about x can be
divided by the opinion about y are
bx =
(1− dx)by
1− dy
,
ux =
(1− dx)uy
1− dy
,
and in this case,
dx∧y =
dx − dy
1− dy
,
ax∧y = 1.
The only information available about bx∧y and ux∧y is that
bx∧y + ux∧y =
1− dx
1− dy
.
On the other hand, bx∧y and ux∧y can be determined if the opinion about x is considered as
the limiting value of other opinions which can be divided by the opinion about y. The limiting
value of the quotient of the opinions is determined by the relative rates of approach of ax, bx
and ux to their limits. Specifically, if γ is the limit of
ay(1− ay)
(ay − ax)(by + ayuy)
(
(1− dy)bx
1− dx
− by
)
+
by
by + ayuy
,
then 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, and the limiting values of bx∧y and ux∧y are
bx∧y =
γ(1− dx)
1− dy
,
ux∧y =
(1− γ)(1− dx)
1− dy
.
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The inverse operation to comultiplication is codivision. The co-quotient of opinions about
propositions x and y represents the opinion about a proposition z which is independent of y
such that ωx = ωy∨z. This requires that ax ≥ ay, bx ≥ by, and
dx ≥
(1− ax)ay(1− bx)dy
ax(1− ay)(1− by)
,
ux ≥
ay(1− bx)uy
ax(1− by)
.
The opinion (bx∨y, dx∨y, ux∨y, ax∨y), which is the co-quotient of the opinion about x and the
opinion about y, is given by
bx∨y =
bx − by
1− by
,
dx∨y =
(1− ay)(1− (bx + axux))
(ax − ay)(1− (by + ayuy))
−
(1− ax)(1− bx)
(ax − ay)(1− by)
=
(1− ay)(dx + (1− ax)ux)
(ax − ay)(dy + (1− ay)uy)
−
(1− ax)(1− bx)
(ax − ay)(1− by)
,
ux∨y =
(1− ay)(1− bx)
(ax − ay)(1− by)
−
(1− ay)(1− (bx + axux))
(ax − ay)(1− (by + ayuy))
=
(1− ay)(1− bx)
(ax − ay)(1− by)
−
(1− ay)(dx + (1− ax)ux)
(ax − ay)(dy + (1− ay)uy)
,
ax∨y =
ax − ay
1− ay
,
if ax > ay. If ax = ay < 1, then the conditions required so that the opinion about x can be
codivided by the opinion about y are
dx =
(1− bx)dy
1− by
,
ux =
(1− bx)uy
1− by
,
and in this case,
bx∨y =
bx − by
1− by
,
ax∨y = 0.
The only information available about dx∨y and ux∨y is that
dx∨y + ux∨y =
1− bx
1− by
.
On the other hand, dx∨y and ux∨y can be determined if the opinion about x is considered as the
limiting value of other opinions which can be codivided by the opinion about y. The limiting
17
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value of the co-quotient of the opinions is determined by the relative rates of approach of ax, dx
and ux to their limits. Specifically, if δ is the limit of
ay(1− ay)
(ax − ay)(dy + (1− ay)uy)
(
(1− by)dx
1− bx
− dy
)
+
dy
dy + (1− ay)uy
,
then 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, and the limiting values of dx∨y and ux∨y are
dx∨y =
δ(1− bx)
1− by
,
ux∨y =
(1− δ)(1− bx)
1− by
.
Given the opinion about x and the atomicity of y, it is possible to use the triangular repre-
sentation of the opinion space from Fig.1 to describe geometrically the range of opinions about
x ∧ y and x ∨ y.
In the case of x∧y, take the projector for ωx, and take the intersections of the projector with
the line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero belief (A and B, respectively). The intersection,
A, with the line of zero uncertainty determines the probability expectation value of ωx. Take the
point, C, on the line of zero uncertainty whose distance from the disbelief vertex is ay times the
distance between the disbelief vertex and A. Take the line BC and the line throughA parallel to
BC. Let D and E be the intersections of these lines with the line of constant disbelief through
ωx, so that the disbelief is equal to dx. Then ωx∧y falls in the closed triangle determined by D,
E and the disbelief vertex, and the atomicity of x ∧ y is given by ax∧y = axay.
In Fig. 10, this is demonstrated with an example where ωx = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6) and ay =
0.4. The opinion ωx has been marked with a small black circle (on the side of the shaded
triangle opposite the disbelief vertex). The intersections A and B of the projector of x with the
line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero belief, respectively, have been marked. The point
C has been placed on the probability axis so that its distance from the disbelief vertex is 0.4
times the distance between A and the disbelief vertex (since ay = 0.4). The line BC, whose
direction corresponds to an atomicity of 0.24 (i.e. the atomicity of x ∧ y), has also been drawn
in the triangle, and its intersection with the line of constant disbelief through ωx (with disbelief
equal to 0.3) has been marked with a white circle. This is the point D, although not marked
as such in the figure. The line through A parallel to BC has also been drawn in the triangle,
and its intersection with the line of constant disbelief through ωx (the point E, although also
not marked as such) has also been marked with a white circle. The triangle with vertices D, E
and the disbelief vertex has been shaded, and the normal product ωx∧y of the opinions must fall
within the shaded triangle or on its boundary. In other words, the closure of the shaded triangle
is the range of all possible values for the opinion ωx∧y.
In the case of x∨ y, take the projector for ωx, and take the intersections of this line with the
line of zero uncertainty and the line of zero disbelief (A and B, respectively). The intersection,
A, with the line of zero uncertainty determines the probability expectation value of ωx. Take the
point, C, on the line of zero uncertainty whose distance from the belief vertex is 1 − ay times
the distance between the belief vertex and A. Take the line BC and the line through A parallel
to BC. Let D and E be the intersections of these lines with the line of constant belief through
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Figure 10: Range of possible opinions for normal product
ωx, so that the belief is equal to bx. Then ωx∨y falls in the closed triangle determined by D, E
and the belief vertex, and the atomicity of x ∨ y is given by ax∨y = ax + ay − axay.
The conditions required so that ωx can be divided by ωy can be described geometrically.
Take the projector for ωy, and take the intersections of this line with the line of zero uncertainty
and with the line of zero belief. Take the lines through each of these points which are parallel
to the projector for ωx (it is required that ax < ay). Take the intersections of these lines with
the line of constant disbelief through ωy. Then ωx can be divided by ωy, provided ωx falls in the
closed triangle determined by these two points and the disbelief vertex.
Fig. 10 can be used to demonstrate. If ωy = (0.3, 0.3, 0.4, 0.6) and ax = 0.24, then the
black circle denotes ωy, the projector of y is the line AB, the lines through A and B parallel
to the director for atomicity 0.24 are drawn in the triangle, and their intersections with the line
of constant disbelief through ωy are marked by the white circles. The closure of the shaded
triangle is the range of all possible values of ωx that allow ωx to be divided by ωy.
The conditions required so that ωx can be codivided by ωy can be described geometrically.
Take the projector for ωy, and take the intersections of this line with the line of zero uncertainty
and with the line of zero disbelief. Take the lines through each of these points which are parallel
to the projector for ωx (it is required that ax > ay). Take the intersections of these lines with
the line of constant belief through ωy. Then ωx can be codivided by ωy, provided ωx falls in the
closed triangle determined by these two points and the belief vertex.
7 Principles of Belief Calculus
Belief calculus follows the fundamental principles outlined below;
• The probability expectation value derived from an belief expression, is always equal to
the probability derived from the corresponding probability expression. For example, let
(opinion expression) represent such a belief expression, and let (probability expression)
represent the corresponding probability expression. By corresponding expression is meant
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that every instance of a belief operator is replaced by the corresponding probability op-
erator,and the every opinion argument is replaced by the probability expectation value of
the same opinion argument. Then we have:
E(opinion expression) = (probability expression) . (41)
• The equivalence between opinions and augmented Beta density functions does not mean
that the augmented Beta PDF that mapped from an opinion derived from a belief expres-
sions is equal to the analytically correct probability density function. In fact, it is not
clear whether it is possible to analytically derive probability density functions bases on
algebraic expressions.
• Because of the coarsening principles used in the (co)multiplication and (co)division oper-
ators, the opinions parameters can sometimes take illegal values, even when the argument
opinions are legal. The general principle for dealing with this problem is to use clip-
ping of the opinion parameters. This consists of adjusting the opinion parameters to legal
values while maintaining the correct expectation value and base rate.
• It is possible to design compact expressions for composite expressions, like e.g. condi-
tional deduction as defined in [5]. The alternative is to use composite expressions as in
Eq.42.
Belief calculus is based on the following fundamental belief operators.
Table 1: Belief calculus operators.
Opinion operator name Opinion operator Logic operator Logic operator name
notation notation
Addition ωx + ωy x ∪ y UNION
Subtraction ωx − ωy x\y DIFFERENCE
Multiplication ωx · ωy x ∧ y AND
Division ωx/ωy x∧y UN-AND
Comultiplication ωx ⊔ ωy x ∨ y OR
Codivision ωx ⊔ ωy x∨y UN-OR
Complement ¬ωx x NOT
From these basic operators, a number of more complex operators can be constructed. Some
examples are for example:
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• Conditional Deduction. Input operands are the positive conditional ωy|x, the negative
conditional ωy|x and the antecedent ωx and its complement ωx. From this, the consequent
ωy‖x, expressed as:
ωy‖x = ωx · ωy|x + ωx · ωy|x . (42)
• Conditional Abduction. Input operands are the positive conditional ωx|y, the negative
conditional ωx|y, the base rate of the consequent y, the antecedent opinion ωx and its
complement ωx. This requires the computation of reverse conditionals according to:
ωy|x =
ωy · ωx|y
ωy · ωx|y + ax · ωx|y
. (43)
ωy|x =
ωy · ¬ωx|y
ωy · ¬ωx|y + ax · ¬ωx|y
. (44)
These two expressions make it possible to compute ωy‖x according to Eq.42.
8 Conclusion
Belief calculus represents a general method for probability calculus under uncertainty. The
simple general operators can be combined in any number of ways to produce composite belief
expressions. Belief calculus will always be consistent with traditional probability calculus.
Belief calculus represents an approximative calculus for uncertain probabilities that are
equivalent to Beta probability density functions. The advantage of this approach is that it pro-
vides an efficient way of analysing models expressed in terms of Beta PDF which otherwise
would be impossible or exceedingly complicated to analyse.
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